This book advocates for the philosophical import of care in re-evaluating problems of humanitarianism in the context of the ongoing international refugee and forced migration situation. In doing so, it rethinks the human capacity to care about the suffering of distant others. At a time when emotional resources are running low, there is a need to recast what it means to care, with the aim of generating a productive movement against the rise of value fundamentalism globally—embraced in mantras of ‘good (...) and evil’ and ‘us and them’—and to confront xenophobia and oppressive politics. The author draws upon a wide array of rich traditions, including historical and contemporary writings on self-care and care of the other, to re-examine the intersection of care ethics and justice. She also rethinks the relationship between care and contestation, here analyzed in the aesthetic, ethical, political, and religious domains of human experience. From within the context of this contingent historical repetition of political oppression, the book constructs a reminder not only of what it feels like to care, but how and why we should act upon our care. Care Ethics and the Refugee Crisis is an important contribution to the growing literatures on care ethics and immigration/forced migration in philosophy. It will also appeal to scholars and advanced students working in other disciplines such as political science, refugee and migration studies, and social anthropology. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's impact on the development of critical theory has received scant study; it is the aim of the book to fill this scholarly lacuna. Kierkegaard and Critical Theory seeks to expose the complexity not only of Kierkegaard but of the Frankfurt School and their cohort, highlighting the ways in which the Danish religious thinker has been redeemed for a multiculture activist ethics in spirit with the fundamental aims of the Frankfurt School.

In this chapter, I present an analysis that re‐examines and reconstructs how Adorno reads Kierkegaard in his 1933 Habilitationsshrift, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic and why he reads him in the manner he does, and inquire what the Kierkegaard book may teach us about Adorno's later philosophic development. In the process of my analysis and in light of my answer to the latter question, we will come to understand Adorno's Kierkegaard reading through the following argument: (i) both a negative and (...) positive theology are present in Kierkegaard; (ii) Adorno embraces only the negative, apophatic and rejects the positive, cataphatic theology because Adorno reads the latter as an escape from worldly needs and action; and (iii) the negative theology that Adorno accepts is instructive of and bears an important relation to Adorno's 1970 Aesthetic Theory. The present chapter thus provides a summary of the most insightful and relevant scholarship on Adorno's intersection with Kierkegaard as well as a new argument about Adorno's Aesthetic Theory from rethinking this intersection. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the interaction between affect and language as articulated in the works of Theodor W. Adorno and Julia Kristeva, sometimes in inchoate and non-explicit ways. Language is always in transit, exile, and dispossession. All language is the language of another, or the other, and precisely because of this, it is the site of dissenting and conflicting affect. In this context, my paper traces a missed but necessary dialogue between Adorno and Kristeva. Adorno’s diagnosis of failed (...) subjective inwardness, first presented in his book on Kierkegaard, was sustained throughout Adorno’s entire oeuvre, to the very end, in his posthumous 1969 Aesthetic Theory. I will explicate Adorno’s forced collapsing of subjective interiority into a negative space that opens up aesthetic emancipatory potential. In what follows I place Adorno’s negativity of subjective inwardness and the aesthetic potential after the fact of its destruction in dialogue with the writings of Kristeva, who has likewise diagnosed a subjective interiority of negativity but framed the latter in terms of the female, abjection and maternity. I conclude by placing Kristeva’s work in conversation with Adorno’s philosophy of the language of music, as one example of their shared framework for aesthetic emancipatory experience. (shrink)

The beginning of Agnes Heller’s philosophic career is marked by a sincere respect for and fascination with Habermas’ work. Indeed, in "The Positivism Debate as a Turning Point in German Postwar Theory," first published in 1978, Heller praised Habermas for his defense of the authentic concerns of everyday life--including human needs, sufferings, and motivations- - and for his critique of the separation between science and ethics. After these early developments, however, the philosophic history between Heller and Habermas unfolded into an (...) unmistakable dissensus. While the explication of the dissensus between them could be analyzed by considering Heller’s additional articles on Habermas, as well as Habermas’ strenuous critique of Heller’s early book, Everyday Life, I show in this article, rather, the ways in which their contrasting positions open up into two domains in which these two great thinkers come closest to each other: namely, the domains of intersubjective liability and corporeal injurability. I highlight the manner in which intersubjective liability and corporeal injurability have impacted their respective ethical theories. The goal of my analysis is to demonstrate why it is important to engage Heller and Habermas today in this missed dialogue. This goal can be realized, above all, in the analysis of lived experience in the everyday life of the corporeal self as it intersects with the contemporaneity of the eternal present in the temporal composition of historical materialism. (shrink)

The question ‘How does a person make an ethical decision?’ becomes all the more compelling and problematic when trying to behave ethically during, as A ́ gnes Heller puts it, ‘the total breakdown of ‘‘normal’’ ethical worlds’. In her philosophical work Heller pieces together a moral compass internal to individual subjectivity to employ during such times. Kierkegaard’s model of existential choice has played a formative role in Heller’s solution to the problem. In my article I describe Heller’s Kierkegaardian framework of (...) choosing oneself as an ethical being and consider a recent critique of Heller’s Kierke- gaardian ethics of personality by Richard J. Bernstein, continuing the substantively pro- ductive tension between the irrational and rational forces that determine our ethical actions. In the process, I show common ground between Bernstein and Heller through an appropriation of Arendtian judgment. I turn to Heller’s most recent work in The Concept of the Beautiful in order to make this common ground tangible. (shrink)

This book details the history of the concept of the beautiful, starting with a distinction between the 'warm' metaphysics of beauty and the 'cold' one modeled on Plato's Janus-faced relationship to beauty, and ending with a fragmented yet hopeful vision propagated by the likes of Nietzsche, Benjamin, and Adorno. The most important intellectual figures to write about beauty in Western metaphysics and in the post-metaphysical age are examined in this book.

Even though the nonidentical is identical—as self-transmitted—it is nonetheless nonidentical: it is otherness to all its identifications.The instants in which a particular frees itself without in turn, by its own particularity, confining others—these instants are anticipations of the unconfined.In man, otherness, which he shares with everything that is, and distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, become uniqueness, and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings. Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness.This revelatory quality of speech and action (...) comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness. Although .. (shrink)

This book highlights, scrutinizes, and deploys Bernstein’s philosophical research as it has intersected and impacted American and European philosophy. The chapters show the breadth and scope of his work while expanding key insights into new contexts and testing his work against thinkers outside the canon of his own scholarship.

The purpose of the study was to develop an understanding of how nursing students gained perspective on nursing care of diverse populations through watching documentaries in a cultural diversity course. The basis of this paper is our analyses of students’ written responses and reactions to documentaries viewed in class. The guiding theoretical frameworks for the course content and the study included postcolonial feminism, Foucauldian thought, and cultural safety. Krathwohl's Taxonomy of the Affective Domain was used to identify themes and determine (...) how undergraduate nursing students were progressing in achieving learning outcomes. Our findings suggest that while the use of documentaries serves as a tool for deepening students’ understanding of the realities of various populations, this activity, in the absence of critical reflection, may inadvertently promote stereotypes and further marginalize different people groups. Even though nursing students reflected on the importance of cultural safety in nursing, our findings indicate that their actions may not reflect this, especially since these students are in the early stages of the nursing program. Students need to be provided with a space where they can explore implicit biases evoked by exposure to new information about different people groups as a way of enhancing culturally safe care. (shrink)

Richard Bernstein has, for several decades, been one of the most prominent thinkers in the tradition of American pragmatism, but he has never narrowly confined his work to pragmatism or American philosophy. His intellectual profile manifests a remarkable pluralism—which, of course, is something that is inherent in the pragmatist tradition itself. The collection of essays honoring Bernstein's legacy edited by Megan Craig and Marcia Morgan is aptly subtitled: "Thinking the Plural". In their various ways, the contributors to this (...) anthology—all of whom have at some point been Bernstein's students in a number of "generations"—not only examine but also exemplify their mentor's deep commitment to... (shrink)

summary, crtiques, strengths and limitation of the article.

Questions about the function of consciousness have long been central to discussions of consciousness in philosophy and psychology. Intuitively, consciousness has an important role to play in the control of many everyday behaviors. However, this view has recently come under attack. In particular, it is becoming increasingly common for scientists and philosophers to argue that a significant body of data emerging from cognitive science shows that conscious states are not involved in the control of behavior. According to these theorists, nonconscious (...) states control most everyday behaviors. Andy Clark does an admirable job of summarizing and defending the most important data thought to support this view. In this paper, I argue that the evidence available does not in fact threaten the view that conscious states play an important and intimate role in the control of much everyday behavior. I thereby defend a philosophically intuitive view about the functions of conscious states in action. (shrink)

Translator's Preface LA LOGIQUE DE HUSSERL, etude sur "Logique for- melle et logique transcendentale" the original of the present translation, was published ...

During the past decade ethical theory has been in a lively state of development, and three basic approaches to ethics - Kantian ethics, consequentialism, and virtue ethics - have assumed positions of particular prominence.

1. Stoicism in classical Latin literature -- 2. Stoicism in Christian Latin thought through the sixth century.

The notion of consciousness, though central to contemporary philosophy of mind, is not well understood. This fact vitiates many recent attempts to develop a theory of consciousness. I aim to achieve a deeper understanding of consciousness by considering what it is that distinguishes conscious mental phenomena from non-conscious mental phenomena. I argue that, contrary to widespread opinion, consciousness is not a matter of a mental state's possessing phenomenality. Nor is it simply a matter of an organism's developing a mental representation, (...) first order or higher order. Rather, I argue, conscious mental phenomena are distinguished from non-conscious mental phenomena by their positioning within a cognitive system. In particular, the conscious mental phenomena are all and only those that are both immediately available to a cognitive mechanism with the function of controlling behavior in novel circumstances and capable of engaging controlled attention. Although my account invokes something like Michael Tye's notion of a mental state's being "poised" to affect certain cognitive mechanisms, it differs from Tye's theory on which mechanisms a state must be poised to affect in order to be conscious. My account is further distanced from Tye's and Dretske's first order representational theories in that it does not restrict the contents of conscious experiences to non-conceptual contents. Rather, I maintain that the contents of conscious experiences are quite diverse, including both conceptual and non-conceptual contents. My arguments, both positive and negative, draw upon a variety of considerations, including the rich body of theory and data emerging from recent work in cognitive science, phenomenological considerations, and more general philosophical considerations such as overall coherence, simplicity, and argumentative support. If correct, my views not only undermine recent arguments for or against the explicability or reducibility of consciousness in physicalist terms, they show that those arguments are not about consciousness at all. Rather, on the framework that emerges in the dissertation, these arguments are about either the contents of mental phenomena or their phenomenal character---neither of which is consciousness. (shrink)

The emphasis on duly in Kant's ethics is widely held to constitute a defect. Marcia W. Baron develops and assesses the criticism, which she sees as comprising two objections: that duty plays too large a role, leaving no room for the supererogatory, and that Kant places too much value on acting from duty. Clearly written and cogently argued, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology takes on the most philosophically intriguing objections to Kant's ethics and subjects them to a rigorous yet (...) sympathetic assessment. (shrink)

...believe that his theory asks too much, demanding total devotion to morality and treating everything worth doing (and perhaps more) as a duty. But, despite their differences, the two sets of...

When successful and ethical managers are alerted to possible organizational wrongdoing, they take corrective action before the problems become crises. However, recent research [e.g., Rynes et al. (2007, Academy of Management Journal50(5), 987–1008)] indicates that many organizations fail to implement evidence-based practices (i.e., practices that are consistent with research findings), in many aspects of human resource management. In this paper, we draw from years of research on whistle-blowing by social scientists and legal scholars and offer concrete suggestions to managers who (...) are interested in encouraging internal reporting of problems requiring attention, and to observers of questionable activity who are considering reporting it. We also identify ways that research suggests policy-makers can have a more positive influence. We hope that these suggestions will help foster evidence-based practice regarding whistle-blowing. (shrink)

The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a justification, (...) or only an excuse? One disagreement I highlight concerns the extent to which justification is primarily about agents rather than about actions. Those who think, as I do, of “His action, X, was justified” as “He was justified in doing X” are far more likely to allow that justification requires reasonable belief and does not require truth, than are those who think of “His action, X, was justified” as “Although actions of this type usually are prohibited, X is in these circumstances in fact permissible.” In addition to sorting out the differences and tracing them to some underlying disagreements, I defend the reasonable belief view of justification against some objections, and argue that, whether or not we continue to use the term “justified” in a way that does not require truth, we need the concept. Contrary to the claims of some who reject the reasonable belief view of justification, justification thus understood does not reduce to excuse. (shrink)

This research aims to explore the relationship between corporate governance and CSR: What are the major factors that play a direct role in the establishment of this relationship? How does context and institutional background impact upon the relationship between CSR and Governance? Using in-depth semi-structured interviews from two types of governance systems in three countries over three years, this study has demonstrated that in practice, within different settings, CSR is being used both as a strategy as well as a reaction (...) to different drivers. We call this adaptive governance where governance can be defined as a flexible system of action incorporating strategic and monitoring activities that determines the way a company enacts its responsibilities to its shareholders and stakeholders and which is determined at any given time by the interrelationship of institutional drivers and behavioural norms. Governance systems and their interrelationships with CSR are demonstrated as fluid according to the national and institutional context, economic situation and industry impact. In the eyes of practitioners corporate governance includes both structural and behavioural factors as well as responsibilities and actions towards shareholders and stakeholders. Contextual factors that this research highlights to be important to the incorporation of CSR into governance include the economic environment, national governance system, regulation and soft law, shareholders, national culture, behavioural norms and industry impacts. Hypotheses on the impact of institutional contexts, industry impacts and economic situations on different types of CSR actions are proposed for further research. (shrink)

This study explores gratitude as a multidimensional and work-specific construct. Utilizing a sample of 625 employees from a variety of positions in a medium-sized school district in the United States, we developed and evaluated a new measure, namely the Work Gratitude Scale, which encompasses recognized conative, cognitive, affective, and social aspects of gratitude. A systematic, six-phased approach through structural equation modeling was used to explore and confirm the factorial structure, internal consistency, measurement invariance, concurrent, convergent, and discriminant validity of the (...) WGS. The results supported a 10-item measure with three dimensions: “grateful appraisals”, “gratitude toward others”, and “intentional attitude of gratitude”. Thereafter, first-order, second-order, and bifactor confirmatory models were estimated and compared. Work gratitude was found to be best described by a second-order construct with three underlying first-order dimensions. Measurement invariance was supported in relation to gender. Concurrent validity was supported in relation to two existing dispositional gratitude scales, namely the Gratitude Questionnaire and the Gratitude, Resentment, and Appreciation Scale. Convergent validity was supported in relation to the Core Self-Evaluations Scale and the Psychological Capital Questionnaire. Discriminant validity was supported in relation to various demographic factors such as age, gender, occupation, and tenure. The findings support the WGS as a multidimensional measure that can be used in practice to measure overall work-related gratitude and to track the effectiveness of gratitude-related workplace interventions. (shrink)

"In recent years, we have grown accustomed to philosophical language that is intensely self-conscious and rhetorically thick, often tragic in tone. It is enlivening to read Bergson, who exerts so little rhetorical pressure while exacting such a substantial effort of thought.... Bergson's texts teach the reader to let go of entrenched intellectual habits and to begin to think differently—to think in time.... Too much and too little have been said about Bergson. Too much, because of the various appropriations of his (...) thought. Too little, because the work itself has not been carefully studied in recent decades."—from Thinking in Time Henri Bergson, whose philosophical works emphasized motion, time, and change, won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927. His work remains influential, particularly in the realms of philosophy, cultural studies, and new media studies. In Thinking in Time, Suzanne Guerlac provides readers with the conceptual and contextual tools necessary for informed appreciation of Bergson's work. Guerlac's straightforward philosophical expositions of two Bergson texts, Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory, focus on the notions of duration and memory—concepts that are central to the philosopher's work. Thinking in Time makes plain that it is well worth learning how to read Bergson effectively: his era and our own share important concerns. Bergson's insistence on the opposition between the automatic and the voluntary and his engagement with the notions of "the living," affect, and embodiment are especially germane to discussions of electronic culture. (shrink)

Although the most common understanding of suicide is intentional self-killing, this conception either rules out someone who lacks mental capacity being classed as a suicide or, if acting intentionally is meant to include this sort of case, then what it means to act intentionally is so weak that intention is not a necessary condition of suicide. This has implications in health care, and has a further bearing on issues such as assisted suicide and health insurance. In this paper, I argue (...) that intention is not a necessary condition of suicide at all. Rather, I develop a novel approach that deploys the structure of a homicide taxonomy to classify and characterise suicides to arrive at a conceptually robust understanding of suicide. According to my analysis of suicide, an agent is the proximate cause of his death. Suicide is ‘self-killing,’ rather than ‘intentional self-killing.’ Adopting this understanding of suicide performs several functions: We acquire an external standard to assess diverging analyses on specific cases by appealing to homologous homicides. Following such a taxonomy differentiates types of suicides. This approach has application in addressing negative connotations about suicide. As a robust view, adding intention is an unnecessary complication. It is more consistent with psychological and sociological assessments of suicide than ‘intentional self-killing.’ It has useful applications in informing public policy. This paper’s focus is on classifying types of suicides, rather than on the moral permissibility or on underlying causes of suicidal ideation and behaviour. (shrink)

Kant formulated a secular argument against suicide’s permissibility based on what he regarded as the intrinsic value of humanity. In this paper, I first show that Kant’s moral framework entails that some types of suicide are morally permissible. Just as some homicides are morally permissible, according to Kant, so are suicides that are performed according to equivalent maxims. Intention, foreseeability, voluntariness, diminished responsibility, and mental capacity determine the moral characterization of the killing. I argue that a suicide taxonomy that differentiates (...) types of suicide according to morally relevant criteria is compatible with Kantian ethics; it establishes that even where we hold a robust deontological sanctity of life position, we are not obligated to preserve the lives of people whose future life only offers profound suffering, and helping them to die may be justifiable if doing so honors their dignity and autonomy. Nevertheless, homicide and suicide are only weakly morally symmetrical in that even if a given suicide is morally impermissible, we do not normally have the right to prevent it forcibly, though this may be altered by juridical laws under some circumstances. (shrink)

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Rene" Descartes started modern Western philosophy on its search for an absolutely certain foundation for knowledge. ...